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Abstract 
 
In this paper building upon several theories (agency theory, stakeholder theory and 
resource dependence theory) and by utilising data from 161 Greek manufacturing 
companies that were listed in the Athens Stock Exchange on the 31st December 2008, 
we explore the relationships between the organisational characteristics of the firms 
(organisational age, organisational size and years listed in the stock market) and the 
Board configuration (board size, board leadership structure and directors’ 
dependence/independence). Both descriptive and inferential statistics (ANOVA tests) 
were utilised to answer the research questions. Interestingly and in alignment with the 
literature, the findings showed that larger organizations tend to have larger boards and 
greater proportions of external and independent directors. However, no more strong 
relationships have been identified between the organisational characteristics and the 
board configuration. Finally, it is worth mentioning that this study examines the listed 
Greek manufacturing companies during very turbulent times, the start of the financial 
crisis in Greece, which may have an impact on the configuration of the boards at that 
time.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Numerous studies in the last couple of decades attempt to establish the links 
between the board characteristics and financial performance of businesses. While 
discussion of hot topics in the corporate governance agenda increases geometrically 
—with examples of limited board diversity, inflated executive compensation and lack 
of transparency in board operations—there is still limited research on what may 
determine the different needs businesses may have in terms of their board 
composition (Koufopoulos et al., 2013; Koufopoulos and Gkliatis 2018). Corporate 
governance (CG) has emerged in the last 20 years mainly due to a number of 
corporate failures and scandals that have drawn the global attention.  Furthermore, the 
financial crisis in 2008 has highlighted issues of CG in a widest sense and the 
corporate governance codes and recommendations are being revisited in order to 
facilitate transparency and accountability of the management processes within 
organisations. Most of the discussion on CG has been driven by concerns with the 
effectiveness of board of directors that is expected to represent the interests of the 
shareholders; a board that that is supposed to control the opportunistic behaviour of 
managers and to provide resources to the firm.  
Previous research has supported the view that national regulatory institutions 
dictate the intra-company corporate governance systems and mechanisms (Aguilera 
and Jackson, 2003; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Sheifer and Vishny, 2000; Filatochev, 
Jackson, Nakajima, 2013; Yoshikawa, Zhu, Wang, 2014). Nevertheless, more recent 
research has highlighted firms do not always comply with the regulatory mandate 
(Bednar, Love and Kraatz, 2015; Chizema, Liu, Lu and Gao, 2015). This is in line 
with the difficulty of estimating the consequences of changes in governance 
provisions on shareholder returns. The selection of the governance structure and the 
type of governance provisions of the firm, have an endogenous origin and they are 
correlated with other firm’s characteristics, which means that if we compare the 
returns of firms with distinct governance structures it would be extremely difficult to 
isolate the effect that governance has over the returns. In addition, investors do 
understand that a better governed firm might have a superior performance, which is 
depicted in higher share prices (Cunat, Gine, Guadalupe, 2012). 
In Greece, CG is a topic of increasing interest, as a result of dysfunctional 
boards, executive misconduct and international pressures for a more shareholder-
oriented model of governance.  However, due to the fact that Greece is a small 
economy with the majority of companies being small to medium, the interest of 
corporate governance is highly concentrated on the listed companies of the Athens 
Stock Exchange (ATHEX). In this study, the focus is on the manufacturing companies 
of the ATHEX, with about half of the total listed companies being characterized as 
such. 
The negative international environment during 2008 has affected the 
performance of the Greek economy. The major financial indices of the Greek 
economy have remained at the same levels with the previous years or became 
negative (Bank of Greece, 2008). It is worth mentioning that during the period 2000-
2010 the manufacturing sector increased with a lower rate than the national economic 
activity (+0.1% from +2.2%). Especially, the manufacturing sector shrunk by 1.7% in 
2008, due to the global financial crisis (Foundation for Economic and Industrial 
Research, 2012). During this period, the production rose only in 9 branches of the 
sector, while in the majority—14 branches—the production declined. More 
specifically, whenever a branch registered an increase, the decline from the rest of the 
branches was significantly stronger (Foundation for Economic and Industrial 
Research, 2008).   
 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Underpinnings. 
  
2.1 Agency Theory 
 
Agency theory has been recognised as one of the most influential theoretical 
models in management and in corporate governance research field (Phillips, 2016; 
Dalton et al., 2007). The division between the interests of the owners (shareholders) 
and the managers in the value creation process, where the first interested party 
employs the second, lays in the core of agency theory. Although, principals expect a 
pre-determined level of output, exogenous factors and deficiency of information 
prevent the determination of this output. Assuming that both parties are utility 
maximisers, the concept of “managerial mischief” is introduced describing the 
diversion of interests between the agents or the information deficiency for the 
principal (Dalton et al., 2007). Managers, in order to maximize their utility either they 
reduce their efforts deliberately or they provide themselves with ‘enhanced’ 
compensation (Hendry and Kiel, 2004). On the other hand, due to non-efficient 
information channels, the self-indulgent actions of the manager are not becoming 
known to the principal. In both cases, the manager acts at his own benefit, and 
disregards the best interests of the principal. In order for the information asymmetry 
to be reduced principals deploy monitoring systems and processes (Bose and Phillips, 
2016).  
Board of directors are considered an indispensable control mechanism for firms 
(Allam, 2018). In addition, they are the only elected mechanism which is designed to 
mitigate the agency problem and protect shareholders interests (Bebchuk & 
Weisbach, 2010). In line with the above the agency perspective calls for larger boards, 
which are more capable of performing the control process and smaller boards (Allam, 
2018). The board independence is another topic where the agency theory and board 
composition are met. The introduction of more independent directors enhances the 
monitoring capability of the board over the management of the company and 
ameliorates its capacity to determine their compensation based on their performance 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Dalton et al., 1999; Coles et 
al., 2008; Krause et al., 2014). Furthermore, the separation between the position of the 
chairman and the CEO, increases the independence of the board, moderating the CEO 
authority and reducing the control over the board (Van Essen et al., 2013). 
2.2 The Stakeholder approach  
The term “stakeholder” was introduced by an internal memorandum at the Stanford 
Research Institute in 1963, according to Parmar et al. (2010), concealing the idea that 
management should be responsive not only to shareholders but to a larger group of 
people that interact with the company.  Businesses are perceived as networks of 
relationships between people that affect or get affected by the company. All these 
groups interact with each other to create value and it is executive’s obligation to manage 
these relations in order to maximize output (Freeman,2010; Strand, 2015). Freeman 
(1984) discussed the interrelation between the company and the stakeholder groups. The 
behaviour towards powerful and important stakeholders is important, because in case of 
a non-acceptable behaviour they may retreat their support (Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 
1997; Harisson et al, 2010). Furthermore, the stakeholder groups could be 
organizational, societal or economic (Wether and Chandler, 2011). Managers should 
create and execute the framework and the procedures needed in order for them to keep 
all the related parties content. By achieving such a task, the long-term viability and 
success of the firm are assured. The above reasoning is not designed to work only in 
stable environments, which are quite rare in our days, it is designed to work in turbulent 
and rapid in change environments. When conflicts of interests and disagreements 
between the stakeholders arise, managers should address the issue in order to assure the 
interests of a broad group of stakeholders (Harrison, Bosse and Phillips, 2010). 
Laplume et al. (2008) commenting on the seminal work of Freeman (1984) 
consider the stakeholder approach as a strategic management process with strong 
moral foundations. Moreover, Freeman et al. (2010, p.196) states, “values, a sense of 
purposes that goes beyond profitability, and concern for the well-being of 
stakeholders were critical to the origins of stakeholder theory”. Strand (2015), from 
the same point of view, presents a variety of rewards for stakeholders, which merely 
are focused to monetary rewards varying from information and status rewards to 
increase in stakeholder’s power. 
 
2.3 Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) 
“One of the most influential theories in the management field of study”, was 
introduced by Pfeffer and Salancik in 1978 with their seminal work “The External 
Control of Organisations” (Hillman, Withers & Collins, 2009 p. 1404). The Resource 
Dependence Theory illustrates the interorganizational factors/links that drive an 
independent organisation to develop relationships with other organisations such as 
board interlocks, alliances, joint ventures, in-sourcing, and mergers and acquisitions 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In the core of RDT resides the fact that no organisation is 
totally independent from its environment. The firms are open systems that interact 
with and are affected by the same environment that they operate in. Therefore, the 
purpose of the aforementioned relationships is to forge organisation’s autonomy 
(uninfluenced decision-making process, Oliver 1991a) and legitimacy (Suchman, 
1995). In a more recent study, Drees and Heugens (2013) using a meta-analysis 
technique have confirmed the importance of interorganizational interdependences in 
enhancing organisational autonomy and legitimacy.  
RDT examines as boards’ primary role its capability to provide provision of 
resources. This comes to oppose agency theory’s point of view of monitoring as the 
primary function of a board. The appointment of external director in RDT serves two 
additional roles apart from their monitoring responsibilities. They provide managerial 
expertise and offer support to the firm. Therefore, individual’s capabilities and skills 
might mitigate the external dependencies of the company (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 
Durand & Jourdan, 2012). In addition, Dowell et al. (2011) argue that board 
configuration should reflect the contingencies of the external environment. Finally, 
several studies have illustrated that the board configuration that responds to external 
environment’s demands, leads to improved organisational performance (Boyd, 1990; 
Hillman et al., 2000; Walls and Hoffman, 2013). 
2.4 Board Characteristics  
 
Board Characteristics refer to the formal structure of the board of directors and 
its major dimensions that are examined in the current study are: board size, board 
leadership structure and directors’ dependence/independence.  
Board Size is an element of board structure (Daily and Dalton, 1992); it can range 
from very small (5) to very large (30 plus) (Chaganti, Mahajan, Sharma, 1985). 
Studies over the past 50 years found the average size being from 12 to 14 members 
(Conference Board, 1962, 1967; Gordon, 1945).  
As board size increases, “expertise” and “critical resources” of a firm (Pfeffer, 
1973) as well as company performance (Singh, 2018) are enhanced. Larger boards 
prevent the CEO from taking actions against shareholders’ interests (Singh and 
Harianto, 1989); however, increased board size hinders initiative and strategic actions 
(Goodstein, Gauten and Boeker, 1994) while unproductive interactions may develop 
as well (O’Reilly, Caldwell and Barnett, 1989). Yildirim-Öktem and Üsdiken (2010) 
and Gabrielsson (2007), analysing the boards in family firms, identified that the board 
size is a manifestation of a more active and influential board. Moreover, larger boards 
provide a larger number of interlocks, which are linked with increased effectiveness 
in the mitigation of organisational problems (Filatochev et al., 2016). It is worth 
mentioning, that larger boards provide better access to critical for the firm resources 
(Musteen et al, 2010). Furthermore, larger boards utilising their capability to delegate 
duties, are able to remove directors easier than smaller boards (Marcel et al, 2013). 
On the contrary, a smaller board has the ability to adopt and exercise a 
controlling role more efficiently due to its more flexible and less bureaucratic 
processes—in relation to larger boards (Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma, 1985). In 
addition, a smaller group size allows for increased participation and social cohesion 
(Muth and Donaldson, 1998) and due to that it may increase board’s performance 
(Koufopoulos et al., 2008; Nguyen et al., 2016).  
Non-executive Independent Directors: The issue of board independence has 
largely been discussed and has attracted the interest of scholars, professionals and 
regulatory bodies, since it is strongly argued that high participation of independent 
directors is needed in the board as they can bring different attributes to the boardroom 
that executives fundamentally can’t provide sufficiently. That is one of the reasons for 
specific quotas demanded from capital market regulators (Zhu et al., 2016).  The main 
purpose of the board is to protect shareholders’ interests and according to agency 
theory, the major role of the board members is to monitor the management and the 
decision process of the organization. Dalton et al. (1998: 275) argue that “outside 
directors may be best able to fulfil the control role when they are not encumbered by 
personal and/or professional relationships with the firm or firm management”. Based 
on the level of association between the non-executive independent directors and the 
proximity of their relationship (business or familial) with the management of the 
company, we could identify a ‘narrow’ and a ‘wide’ definition of the term. However, 
it must be highlighted that the notion of non-executive independent directors is 
defined differently in various countries (e.g. Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010). 
Agency theorists and corporate governance codes (i.e. The UK Corporate 
Governance Code, 2016; OECD, 2004; Vienot Report, 1999) support an inclusion of 
a number of non-executive independent directors in the board. As they claim, 
performance will be improved when the board can better monitor the CEO (Harris 
and Helfat, 1998). They also state that if a company mainly consists of executive 
directors that may have close relationship with the CEO, much power is concentrated 
to one individual who is able to make decisions that do not maximise stakeholders’ 
wealth (Higgs Review, 2003; Mallete and Fowler, 1992).  This inclusion of the right 
mix of executives and non-executives is considered a condition for avoiding a 
“conflict of interest” between “corporate constituencies” and “management”, and due 
to that it improves the boards’ ability to govern (OECD, 2004). 
Apart from the view of the agency theory that focuses on the contribution of 
non-executive directors to the monitoring function, the appointment of outside 
directors in a board can also be useful in terms of provision of resources (Hillman et 
al., 2009). These resources may be translated as the directors’ human capital that is 
their knowledge, expertise and past experience, but also their so-called social capital 
that is mainly related to their networking skills. Zahra and Pearce (1989: 308) support 
that “boards with a majority of outside directors are in a position to establish viable 
links with different sectors of the external environment”.  In similar lines, Dalton et 
al. (1998) argue that non-executive directors may have more access to external 
information and resources than executive directors, who are largely busy with their 
organisation’s operational responsibilities. The authors make a further comment by 
distinguishing affiliated from independent non-executive directors; non-executive 
directors “with personal relationships (e.g. family relations) with firm management 
may be less effective at the resource dependence and counselling/expertise roles than 
outside directors without such relationships” (p. 275). 
Finally, Adams et al. (2010) supports that there is ambiguity regarding the 
contribution of non-executive independent directors to the value adding process for 
the shareholders. Strengthening the aforementioned argument, Ma and Khanna (2016) 
suggested that social independence restrictions and personal bias shape their corporate 
behaviour.   
 
2.5 Organizational Characteristics 
Three organisational characteristics are regarded as some of the board 
determinants that have been overlooked in studies of corporate governance. 
Organisational Size: Agency perspective supports that, larger firms require a 
greater number of directors to monitor and control a firm’s activities (Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2005). Similarly, resource dependency theory suggests that while there is a 
need for “environmental linkage”, that is establishing connections and relationships 
with external stakeholders, the firm’s board size increases (Allen, 1974; Dooley, 
1969). In other words, larger organisations require access to more resources; in order 
to attain them, they appoint more directors, who provide access to necessary resources 
(Kiel and Nicholson, 2005). Shevchenko et al. (2016) has found that larger firms 
driven from their capability to control and moderate their relationships with the 
external stakeholders, are restrained to a prolonged period of uncertainty. Empirical 
findings concerning small to medium firms have shown that small firms 
(approximately 30 employees) have boards composed of “single-owner” managers or 
small teams, compared to large firms (approximately 100 employees) who employ 
larger boards (Bennett and Robson, 2004). This positive relationship of organizational 
size with board size is also supported by the results of Denis and Sarin (1999) and 
Yermack (1996).  
Additionally, according to resource dependence perspective (Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003) as board size increases, it is expected that the increased capacity results in 
providing more resources, by summing up each member’s expertise and networking 
skills. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 168) support this idea by suggesting that the board 
size would adjust on the needs of the organisation for access to resources and that the 
greater the needs, the larger the size. Therefore, it is expected that a greater number of 
directors will lead to increased supply of resources, which may be the need in larger 
organisations.  
Organisational size also impacts “board structure”. Ali (2018) found that—
especially in manufacturing firms—as the size of the company increases, there is 
tendency to have larger boards. Moreover, it is argued (Lehn et al., 2009) that larger 
firms require more non-executive directors because their large size increases the 
potential for agency problems.  Hence, apart from the need for more outside directors, 
separation and independence of the Chairperson to the CEO is strongly suggested 
(Krause et al., 2014; Lublin, 2012) even though the literature also offers opposite 
results (Linck et al., 2008). 
Larger companies are considered able to perform sophisticated analysis, to have 
a wide array of choices and to be able to prevent or mitigate the negative 
consequences of their decisions (Lange and Washburn, 2012). Firm size is a 
determining factor for the success of CSR strategies, as larger firms are able to 
communicate symbolically their policies instead of focusing on their implementation 
(Wickert et al, 2016).   
Organisational Age: Adaptive System perspective implies that organizational 
age is an indicator of accumulated knowledge and experience (Carroll and Harrison, 
1998; Glance et al., 1997; Lant and Mezias, 1992; Lin and Hui, 1999). Similarly, 
“institutional theory of action” implies that as an organisation ages, reliance on rules 
increases (Zhou, 1993). Organisational age is associated with aspects of 
organisational structure (Pugh et al., 1963) and organisational policies (Kimberly and 
Miles, 1980). Thus it may be suggested that age can be a predictor of various board 
characteristics. For instance, OECD (1999; 2004) recommends that at least one third 
of the total number of directors serving a board should consist of non-executive 
members. The aim of this recommendation is to avoid the concentration of much 
power to executive directors in order to protect shareholders’ interests. Therefore, 
starting with the assumption that organisational age is associated with more 
established procedures and structures, it may be expected that board size and number 
of independent directors increase as the organisation ages. Another assumption made 
to support these relationships is that as the organisation ages, its size is expected to 
increase (Baum, 2000). Older and larger organisations are more exposed to external 
environment, which may require additional resources. This can be translated as 
increased board size and higher need for non-executives that can bring resources and 
at the same time control the firm.  
Firm age is a decisive factor for the risk level that a company might bare, a 
negative relationship between firm age and corporate risk taking has been observed 
(Faccio et al., 2001). In addition, Madsen and Leiben (2015) analysing the 
determinants of persistence in innovation, concluded that older firms are more 
consistent with higher levels of innovation. Finally, firm age plays an important role 
in sector exit strategies, as older firms tend to be acquired by their competitors 
(Fortune and Mitchell, 2012). 
Number of Years listed in the Stock Exchange: To ensure shareholders’ 
interests, listed companies appoint non-executive directors (Westhead, 1999). For 
instance, companies in the London Stock Exchange have at least three “non-
executive” directors in the board (Kesner and Dalton, 1994), while Greek Law No. 
3016/2002 implies that independent non-executive directors should account for one 
third of the Board, with no less than two members. Additionally, the law establishes 
rules and regulations regarding: obligations of the board, internal control mechanisms, 
transparency, and disclosure. 
Moreover, empirical research suggests that the length of period a corporation is 
listed in a Stock Exchange can affect its governance mechanisms and performance 
(Ritter, 1984; Aggarwal, Leal and Hernandez, 1993; Levis, 1993; Loughran and 
Ritter, 1995). Listed companies have more formalised boards, more frequent 
meetings, and provide financial information to the public so as to carry out board 
functions and fulfil legal responsibilities (Demb and Neubauer, 1992). In listed 
companies, boards have more formal channels of communication due to the increased 
exposure to the public that attracts investors’ attention on corporate governance. This 
formality and pressure from the outside should lead to more proper and transparent 
processes for selecting and dismissing CEOs (Long, Dulewicz and Gay, 2005).  
Therefore, it is assumed that firms attempting to ferment their place in a stock 
exchange are establishing larger and more diverse boards, in order to fulfil the needs 
of stakeholders. Moreover, the more the years an organisation has been listed, the 
more it is expected to comply with policies and legal requirements. Boone et al. 
(2007), who named the years since the IPO as firm age, found that the number of 
directors steadily increases after the IPO for at least 10 years, while studies from 
authors (Denis and Sarin, 1999; Gkliatis et al., 2009) that also included older listed 
firms in their samples, strengthen the view that the board size continues to increase 
after those 10 years. Increase in board size is positively associated with the 
independence of the board, as usually companies that tend to employ more directors, 
they seek for outside directors, which will improve the monitoring function of the 
board and also bring the needed resources to the increased requirements of the firm.  
 
3. Methodology 
Sample: The sample consists of all 161 Greek manufacturing companies that 
were listed in the Athens Stock Exchange on the 31st December 2008.  The main 
source used for the data collection was the Athens Stock Exchange website 
(http://www.helex.gr/). In case that full data could not be found for some of the 
companies, the websites and annual reports of the respective companies were also 
scrutinized. 
Measurements: 
Board size was measured by the absolute number of directors.   
Board leadership structure (Duality): Board leadership structure was determined by 
assessing if the roles of Chairperson and CEO are combined to one individual. Within 
companies that employed the separate structure, a simple criterion of affiliation was 
examined. The surnames for the 2 persons sitting on the Chairpersons-CEOs positions 
were checked and in the cases that were identical, were classified as separate but 
affiliated. 
External Independent Directors:  This variable was measured by finding the absolute 
number of external directors on the board. Then, these were separated in dependent 
(affiliated) and independent. 
Proportion of Independent Directors to the board size: After finding the absolute 
number of independent directors in each board, the fraction of independent directors 
to total board size was measured to find the proportion of independent to total 
directors. 
Organisational size: This variable measured with the absolute number of employees 
based on the information provided by the ATHEX website and was re-classified into 
4 major groups; up to 50 employees, 51-250, 251-500 and 501 and over. 
Organizational Age: The variable was measured by noting the year of establishment 
of the respective company. Three age groups were created and these categories 
according to the year of establishment were: up to 1970, 1971-1989 and 1990 to 2008. 
Years Listed in the ATHEX: The year of entrance in the ATHEX was noted for each 
company and then three categories were generated to group the companies: Veterans 
(included the companies that went public earlier than 1980), Mature (from 1980 to 
1999) and finally Neophytes (2000-2007). 
ANOVA tests: ANOVA was used to examine whether there are significant differences 
in board size, number of independent directors and proportion of independent 
directors to the board size, in organisations of different size, age and the years being 
listed in the stock exchange. Specifically, the organisational characteristics were split 
in groups and an investigation of statistical mean differences among these groups—in 
terms of the board characteristics—was performed (Figure 1). 
 
4. Findings 
4.1 Descriptive Findings 
The results show some important elements of the status of Board of Directors 
in the listed companies at the Athens Stock Exchange.  
Board size: The average number of directors was 7.4, while 99 (61.5%) 
companies had 5 to 7 board members. 
Board Leadership Structure: There were 92 (57.1%) companies (n=161) that 
adopted a separated board structure. However, in 35 (21.7% of total sample) of the 
above cases although job separation existed, strong indications of affiliated status 
(based on a common surname) were present. On the other hand, a joint structure was 
employed by 69 (42.9%) of the listed companies. 
Board composition: 571 out of the 1191 positions held by the directors were 
internal, while 615 of them were external positions (there were five positions for 
which the status was not found). On average 3.6 members were characterized as 
internal board members, while 118 of the boards (73.3%) employed 2 to 4 internal 
directors. On the other hand, the average for external board members was 3.82, with 
118 (74.6%) companies having from 2 to 4 external directors. Nevertheless, a closer 
examination on the data regarding the External/Non-Executive Directors revealed that 
on average 1.49 (39%) of those 3.82 external directors were affiliated or dependent. It 
is worth mentioning that only 42 (26.1%) of the listed companies had no externals 
that are dependent. 
Furthermore, boards in Greek listed companies had on average 2.3 
independent board members (61% of the 3.82 external members/company), with 130 
(80.7%) companies having exactly 2 independent members.  
Company size: Only 16 (10.1%) of the companies (n=159) can be 
characterized as small (up to 50 employees), while 57 (35.8%) companies fall under 
the medium size category (51 to 250 employees) based on the European Union 
classification. In addition, 38 (23.9%) companies employ between 251 and 500 
employees, while there are 48 (30.2%) of the companies that can be classified as large 
(over 500 employees). 
Organisational Age: 52 (32.3%) companies listed in the ATHEX were 
established before 1970, while 83 (51.6%) of them were established between 1971 
and 1989. The companies that were established after 1990 are 26 (16.1%).  
Years Listed in the ATHEX: Out of the 161 companies, 27 (16.8%) were 
classified as Veterans. The majority of the companies, being 95 (59%), were under the 
Mature group (50.7%) and the Neophytes were 39 (24.2%). 
4.2 ANOVA Tests 
Board size was found to be significantly different (p<0.01) among the four 
groups of company size (Table 1). In addition, significant difference was found 
among groups of company size in terms of their independent (p<0.01) members. 
Finally, no significant difference was found in the means of proportion of independent 
members to the board size among the groups. 
Furthermore, there are noticeable differences in the means of board size, 
independent members and the proportion of them to the total board size in terms of 
the different groups of age and listed years. However, while according to the review 
of the literature, there was an expectation for these differences to be significant, 
ANOVA results did not find any significance difference among these groups.  
 
5. Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
To sum up, the average board size is 7.4 members and about one third of the boards 
(35%) have chosen to appoint different persons in the leadership positions that are 
also independent. The internal members were found to be 3.6 per company and the 
externals were 3.82 but 1.49 of them were dependent to their companies. In addition, 
the findings on organizational characteristics, show that manufacturing companies are 
relatively old, large and with a long presence in the ATHEX. This conclusion 
becomes stronger if we compare to the service companies findings in the ATHEX for 
the same year (HOCG, 2009). 
Moreover, while the findings do not support any significant relationship of board 
characteristics with the age of the organisation and the period it has been listed in the 
stock exchange, some useful conclusions can be provided, in relation to the size of the 
organisation. The findings showed that larger organizations tend to have larger boards 
and greater proportions of external and independent directors. This may be explained 
by the fact that larger organizations are more complex and as a result they require 
more directors to be successfully governed. This can be further argued by considering 
the roles of board directors as found in the literature (e.g. Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; 
Forbes and Milliken 1999; Zona et al. 2013)—mainly described as monitoring and 
providing service/resources to the organisation. It is assumed that the larger the 
organisation the more exposed it is to the public and the more pressure for increased 
accountability and performance. 
A potential limitation that should be taken into account is that the dependent variables 
tested through analysis of variances technique are most likely interdependent—and 
correlated—which suggests that they should be re-examined. Specifically, this can be 
easily argued by understanding the relationship of the independent directors to the 
boards. Most corporate governance codes (e.g. the Higgs review, 2003; Vienot report, 
1999; UK corporate Governance code, 2016) strongly suggest that a board should 
have a minimum of one third of its members being independent. This clearly 
correlates the board size with the independent directors as the larger the board, the 
more the independents. This is why the meta-variable ‘Proportion of Independent to 
the board size’ was considered appropriate for inclusion, however it was not found 
significantly related to the organisational characteristics and further investigation is 
proposed.  
Furthermore, it would not be right to generalise the findings, as it would improve 
validity if data in time series of three or five or more consecutive years was used. 
During the period of data collection, the activities of the Greek listed companies 
might have been influenced by external factors, i.e. the economic crisis. Second, the 
sample of this study consisted of a cross-section of firms of different sizes, ages, and 
operating in one broad sector (i.e. manufacturing), which cannot provide safe 
conclusions regarding the corporate governance practices and for all Greek listed and 
non listed firms. 
Further research may assess this topic by the use of more independent variables, such 
as the rate of firms’ internationalization and more dependent variables such as the 
presence of interlocking directorates. The current study offers additional 
understanding on the relation between board characteristics and organizational 
demography. To conclude, further research is recommended in order to collect new 
data on the existing variables to further examine the relationships. Future studies can 
focus on different markets/sectors, which can add more insight on the nature and 
extent of the proposed relationships. 
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Figure 1 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical Model 
Organisational Demography 
Ø Organisational Size 
Ø Organisational Age 
Ø Years listed in the 
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             Board Characteristics 
Ø Board Size 
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o Proportion of 
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Table 1:  ANOVA Results 
                                                     
Dependent 
Board Size Independent Members Proportion of 
Independent to the 
board size 
Sig. 
level 
Independent  Mean F Mean F Mean F  
Organisational Size 
A. up to 50 
B. 51 to 250 
C. 251 to 500 
D. more than 500 
 
6.19(n=16) 
6.61(n=57) 
7.45(n=38) 
8.56(n=48) 
10.607** 
 
 
1.94(n=16) 
2.21(n=57) 
2.26(n=38) 
2.71(n=48) 
3.325* 
 
 
0.331(n=16) 
0.344(n=57) 
0.322(n=38) 
0.320(n=48) 
0.422 
 
*p<0.05;  
**p<0.01 
 
 Tamhane’s test* 
D>A; D>B 
   
Organisational Age (year of 
establ.) 
A. up to 1970 
B. 1971-1989 
C. 1990-2007 
 
7.90(n=52) 
7.23(n=83) 
6.92(n=26) 
2.341 
 
 
2.48(n=52) 
2.27(n=83) 
2.31(n=26) 
0.713 
 
 
0.321(n=84) 
0.329(n=132) 
0.343(n=77) 
0.307 *p<0.05;  
**p<0.01 
 
      
Year listed in the ATHEX 
A. Veterans (earlier than 1980) 
B. Mature (1980-1999) 
C. Néophytes (2000-2008) 
 
7.56(n=27) 
7.41(n=95) 
7.26(n=39) 
0.155 
 
 
2.56(n=27) 
2.27(n=95) 
2.36(n=39) 
0.790 
 
 
0.348(n=27) 
0.318(n=95) 
0.340(n=39) 
0.978 *p<0.05;  
**p<0.01 
 
     
 
